AGRICULTURAL STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT TO GOVERNMENT POLICIES: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE by Ahearn, Mary Clare et al.





Mary Clare Ahearn, Economic Research Service 
Jet Yee, Economic Research Service and 
 Penni Korb, Economic Research Service
1 
 
Summary:  Economic theory alone cannot predict the impacts of government payments on farm 
structure.  We estimate a 5-equation model for the 1978-96 period to measure the impacts using 
state micro and macro data sets.  We found that government payments were positively associated 
with farm size and farm exits, but negatively associated with the extent of consolidation in farm 
production and the off-farm work of operators. 
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In 2002, approximately 40 percent of U.S. farms received government payments, and this share has 
been increasing somewhat over time, largely as a result of new agri-environmental programs (e.g., 
the Environmental Quality Incentives Program, EQIP).  Although the majority of farms do not 
receive payments, payments affect the farm sector at large through their capitalization into land 
values and because of their magnitude (accounting for nearly 30% of net farm income for the whole 
sector during the last decade).   
  In his classic book, The Development of American Agriculture: A Historical Analysis, 
Cochrane describes the “cannibalism” effect of technology and government agricultural commodity 
programs, in which payments allow the large farms, often times the early adopters of new 
technology, to buy out their smaller neighbors largely through the effects of increases in 
productivity.  But, more recently others have made similar observations regarding the effects of 
payments encouraging farms to get larger, including such widely differing sources as the 
agricultural policy watchdog, the Environmental Working Group, and the USDA’s Chief Economist 
(Collins, 2001; EWG, 2003).   
  Alternative conceptual models posit that payments do just the opposite.  That is, some 
arguments conclude that payments act to keep small and medium-sized farms in business, slowing 
down the technological forces that tend to increase farm size. Unfortunately, economic theory does 
not offer clear direction on the critical relationships.  Leathers (1992) has shown formally how the 
impact of alternative agricultural programs on the structure of agriculture cannot be predicted by 
theory alone.     3
  Government programs that distribute payments to participants have a variety of goals.  
However, none of the explicit goals of the programs is to increase farm size.  In fact, an oft-stated 
public policy concern is that the share of the sector that could be classified as family farms is 
shrinking.   This concern arises because there is some belief that family farms have a public good 
nature to them and are important to preserve.  Any evidence that would show that payments have an 
unintended consequence of increasing farm size would likely be of interest to policy makers. 
Therefore, there is an interest in understanding how past government policies have affected the 
structure of agriculture and how future policies could be designed to achieve preferred social 
outcomes.   For example, there is an interest in understanding how government policies can be 
designed so as to strengthen the survivability of family farms, or at least not to contribute to their 
demise while accomplishing other goals.  
  In spite of this policy interest in understanding how payments affect farm structure, there is 
a lack of definitive empirical results.  This is likely a result of the complexity of factors that are 
related to structural change, and the importance of identifying their separate roles.  A major factor 
contributing to farm consolidation is economies of scale.  Economies of scale allow more 
agricultural product to be produced at lower per unit costs.  Lower per unit costs may also result 
from increases in productivity.  Therefore, it is important to account for this underlying technical 
change that occurs over time in explaining structural change impacts of government payments.  The 
structural change process is a macro event that occurs rather slowly over time, as a result of micro-
level decisions.  Hence, empirical applications require extensive panel data.  Without definitive 
empirical applications to provide direction, the variety of conflicting conceptual models of the 
causal relationship between government payments and farm structure have endured.   4
  Huffman and Evenson (2001) made a recent empirical contribution to the literature in 
relating how farm structural change and government policies affect productivity.  They assumed 
that farm structure affected productivity, and that the relationship was one-way, i.e., farm 
productivity did not affect farm structure.   They used state level data from 1950 to 1982 to consider 
the relationship between farm structure, government policies, and productivity changes over the 
period.  They found that farm structural change does affect productivity.  They also found that 
public R&D affects farm structure, while agricultural policies had some small impact on structure.   
  More recently, Ahearn, Yee, and Huffman (2002) examined the key relationships between 
productivity and farm size for a relatively recent period in the history of agricultural structural 
adjustment, the period 1960-96.  In contrast to Huffman and Evenson, they modeled the relationship 
between farm structure and productivity as a two-way relationship.  Their results provided evidence 
that indeed supported a simultaneous relationship. They found that government investments had 
positive and significant impacts on productivity.  This was true considering public investments in 
research, extension, highways, and commodity programs.  They also found that government 
commodity payments had a negative impact on off-farm labor supply of farm households and a 
positive impact on farm size.   
  Undoubtedly, some of the expansion in average farm size observed in these two studies as a 
result of payments came from the consolidation of farms that exited the sector.  Key and Roberts 
(2003) considered what effect payments had on the size and survival of a subset of farms that 
receive commodity payments between 1987 and 1997, ignoring the role of productivity.  Key and 
Roberts concluded that payments had a positive, but small, effect on farm size for the subset of 
farms.  This is consistent with the results of the other two studies cited for the total farm sector, not 
just those farms that participated in government programs.  Unlike the other studies, Key and   5
Roberts also considered the influence of payments on farm survivability, and found that payments 
had a significant influence on farm survivability of those farms that participated in programs.   
The purpose of this paper is to build on the previous empirical studies (Huffman and 
Evenson and Ahearn, Yee, and Huffman) that examined government payments, productivity, and 
farm structure variables.  In this paper, we ask not only how have payments affected the links 
among productivity, off-farm work, and farm consolidation, but how have payments affected the 
exiting of farms out of agriculture altogether?  Note that we are interested in examining how 
payments have affected all farms, not just those that received payments.  We are able to do this by 
taking advantage of a rich data base which links individual farms across recent agricultural 
censuses, in conjunction with state level aggregate data.  The individual farm data base is available 
for 1978 forward and is further described in the appendix.  Before we present our model, data, and 
results, we first provide a brief description of the changing structure of U.S. agriculture, focusing 
largely on our study period, 1978-96. 
 
Structural change in U.S. agriculture 
Major changes in the organization of U.S. agriculture are captured by examining trends in total 
factor productivity (TFP), the size distribution of farms, entry and exit of farms, and farm household 
labor allocations. 
Productivity.  Over the past century, productivity has been the major force behind the 
changes in U.S. agricultural output.  Between 1978 and 1996, the rate of growth in total factor 
productivity in agriculture was 2.71 percent on an annual average basis 
(http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/AgProductivity/#data).  Using 1996 as the base year (i.e., 1996 = 
100), the 1978 index of agricultural output was 71.1.  In comparison to this increase in the output   6
index, measured aggregate inputs actually declined during that same period.  The total input index 
in 1978 was 115.8 compared to 100 in 1996.  But, some input categories increased and some 
decreased.  The labor input for U.S. agriculture declined dramatically and steadily over the longer 
run period of 1948 to 1985, and then declined more slowly to 1996.  In contrast to the longer run 
period of 1948-1996 when capital was increasing, capital actually declined during the 1978-96 
period.  Total intermediate inputs continued to rise during the 1978-96 period, but two component 
inputs of that group, energy and farm origin inputs, actually declined.  Of course, these national 
estimates mask differences in the productivity of states.   
  Farm size distribution.  The size distribution of U.S. farms is very skewed, hence, it is useful 
to consider both changes in average farm sizes and the concentration of production in the sector. 
Concentration of production, or consolidation, brings a variety of potential social concerns.  
Concentration can lead to market power and reduced competition, reduced innovation, lack of 
market transparency, and adverse impacts in some communities. Because there is no clear 
consensus on what level of concentration is dangerously high, there is a general interest in 
monitoring consolidation in agriculture.   
  The aggregate amount of agricultural land has been relatively fixed during the 20
th century, 
and so the change in the number of farms is closely correlated with the change in the size of farms, 
which has generally been increasing until recent years.    Since 1978, the total number of farms has 
remained about 2 million.  The number of large farms (>1,000 acres) and smallest farms (<50 acres) 
has increased, but the number of mid-sized farms has declined.  Two distinct forces drive the 
evolving structural changes of the U.S. farm sector.  First, the pressures to minimize costs and 
consumer prices and to provide products with attributes that are more tailored to the specific 
demands of consumers drives the concentration in production.  Secondly, the fact that most farm   7
households earn cash income from off-farm sources is a primary driver of the resource allocation 
choices they make.  Half of all agricultural product is produced by 2% of U.S. farms (approximately 
46,000) (Figure 1).   
  The overriding characteristic of the U.S. farm sector is its diversity.  Size is the most 
obvious example of that diversity, and hence is a leading structural indicator.  Table 1 provides 
recent statistics (for 2002) on the diversity of farm households by a gross value of product size 
concept.  More than three-quarters of farms have gross farm sales less than $50,000 and, on 
average, lose money farming.  However, their off-farm income is above the U.S. average income 
for all households.  The farm households with gross farm sales of $50,000 to $500,000 have similar 
farm characteristics in terms of the number and types of commodities produced and the 
participation in government programs.  The largest farms, those with sales over $500,000 have a 
different farm profile.  The largest farms are more likely to use contracts and to produce high value 
crops and livestock, other than dairy.  Hence, given the focus of government farm direct payment 
programs on cash grains and cotton, the largest farms are less likely than the mid-sized farms to 
receive payments, although large farms that receive payments average a higher payment than other 
farms.        
  There is a great deal of dynamics underlying the statistics on average farm size.  Over any 
given period, some farms expand, but other farms contract.  Figure 2 shows the distribution of 
changes in acres operated for the farms that survived from one census to the next.  For example, 
during the 1992-97 period, only about 30% of the surviving farms did not expand or reduce their 
acres operated. 
  Entry-Exit.  The relatively slow rate of decline in the number of farms over time masks 
significant exit and entry.   Exits, entrants, and surviving farm rates vary by inter-census-time   8
period (figure 3).  Many farms go out of business and many new farms come into business.  For 
example, in 1997 62% of the farms that existed in 1992 were still in existence, and 38% of the 1992 
farms had exited.  However, roughly the same number of farms entered farming during the period 
as exited.  Hence, little change in the number of total farms between the 1992 Census of Agriculture 
and the 1997 Census occurred.  The high rate of entry into agriculture is an indicator that anti-
competitive barriers to entry likely do not exist.  The total land in agriculture is more stable over 
time than the number of farms, but there is also considerable shifting of land.  Land moves to and 
from agricultural and nonagricultural uses, for example, between agricultural and forest uses.  Land 
also shifts among agricultural uses, such as pasture and cropland.  Much of the land operated by the 
farms that exit agriculture is subsequently purchased or rented by existing farms to expand their 
operation.   
  Farm Household Labor Allocations. The majority of workers on U.S. farms are the operators 
and their families, contributing at least two-thirds of the labor hours worked. By definition, all 
operators work on the farm, but also 40 percent of spouses, primarily female, work on the farm.  In 
addition, most farm families (72% in 2002, table 1) have at least one family member working in a 
non-farm occupation and in about half of those families both the operator and spouse work off the 
farm (USDA, 2001).  Operators are more likely than spouses to work off the farm, 56 percent 
compared to 46 percent (USDA, 2001).  Over all only about 5 percent of total farm household 
income is from farm sources (table 1).  Also, as has been the case for some time, off-farm income 
has played a major role in closing the income gap between farm and non-farm households and in 
reducing income inequality among farm operator households (Ahearn, Strickland, and Johnson, 
1985; Mishra, et al., 2002). 
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The Theoretical Model 
As mentioned previously, economic theory does not provide a clear prediction of the final impact of 
government payments on farm structure.  However, economic theory does provide a model of the 
micro decisions of the farm household affected by payments.  Because nearly all U.S. farms (more 
than 90%) are family businesses, the household production model is a useful theoretical model for 
examining resource allocation choices that result in structural change over time.  Farm households 
provide most of the labor on the farm and have a tripartite choice of time allocation (farm, off-farm, 
and leisure hours).  The household production model is an extension of the basic labor-leisure 
model (e.g., Becker, 1965).  The conceptual model combines the decisions of agricultural 
households relating to production, consumption, and labor supply into a theoretically consistent 
model (e.g., Strauss, 1986).  The individual is assumed to allocate time to farm work, off-farm 
work, and leisure in such a fashion that the optimal allocation is achieved when the marginal values 
of time devoted to the activities are equal.  Because of the dependence of farm households on off-
farm income sources and the fixed supply of household labor, an important component of this 
literature is the empirical literature on estimating off-farm labor participation and supply (e.g., El-
Osta and Ahearn, 1996; Hallberg, et al., 1991; Mishra and Goodwin, 1997).
2  
The farm operator household is assumed to have the optimization problem: 
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2 This presentation of the model presents the most basic version of the static model, which ignores many of the possible 
complexities of the model.  For example, the model ignores the interdependence of the allocation decision between 
operator and spouse, the utility of others in the household, uncertainty, non-farm home production, commuting costs 
and other transaction costs of off-farm jobs, possible psychic income from farming, and household savings. 
 
3 The human capital (H) and other characteristics (Z) can also be written so as to be specific to farm work, off-farm 
work, or home time.  For simplification, we have kept a general specification here.   10
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where 
 
U = joint household utility, 
Ch = goods and services consumed by the household, 
Th = leisure (or home time) of household members, 
H = the human capital of household members, 
Z = other household and local area characteristics,  
T  = total time endowment of household, 
To = total time of household allocated to off-farm work, 
Tf = total time of household allocated to farm work, 
Ph = the price of consumption goods and services, 
Pf = output price of farm commodities, 
F = farm production function, 
Xf = inputs used in farm production, including hired labor, 
Px = input price for farm production inputs, 
wm=  market wage, 
V= non-labor income (including from government payments). 
 
The utility function and the production function are assumed to be concave, continuous, and twice 
differentiable.  The first-order conditions for the above model provide many useful results, 
including the demand functions for farm household labor in farming, the demand for hired farm 
labor, the demand for household home time (or leisure), and the off-farm labor supply of the farm 
household.  The derivation of these labor-related functions depends on the assumption to be made 
about the decision process of the household and the relative completeness of the markets, e.g., the 
off-farm labor market or the labor market for hired farmworkers.   
  The decision process is either simultaneous or recursive.  In the first case, the model is said 
to be nonseparable and in the latter, separable.  In the nonseparable model, price-related constraints 
are provided by an internal shadow price determination.  In the separable model, price-related 
constraints are provided by assuming perfect markets and fixing prices exogenously (Taylor and 
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Adelman, 2003).  In the separable model with complete labor markets, the price of home time, or 
leisure, becomes the market wage rate. The model provides demands for farm household labor in 
farming, for leisure time (including maintenance time), and off-farm work.  One of the possible 
solutions for the farm household is to provide no labor to the farm business, that is, to exit 
agriculture entirely.  Farm households will continue in farming as long as the marginal utility per 
dollar earned from additional farm work is greater than the marginal utility per dollar earned from 
additional off-farm work.  Otherwise, standard economic theory would predict that farm households 
will exit farming.  This model can be extended to explain other dimensions of farm structure.  For 
example, increased off-farm work may be associated with smaller farm size, as more time spent 
working off-farm means less time available for working on the farm.  Human capital and other 
household characteristics may have an impact on farm level productivity, as well as the allocation 
of time between farm and off-farm work.   
The household production model, while useful for characterizing individual micro decisions, 
does not directly translate into direction of farm sector structural change, especially because of the 
vast diversity among farm households.  For policy purposes, structural change is of interest at some 
collective level.  Households make micro choices that result in collective impacts at the state (or 
other aggregated) level of interest.  Individual farm production choices lead to aggregate state 
productivity levels; allocation of time and resources to farming result in state average farm size, 
measures of concentration of production in the state, and farm exit rates in a state; and allocation of 
time (including none) to off-farm work result in state off-farm labor supply.   We now turn to our 
empirical model using state-level data.     
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The Empirical Model   
We employ the following 5-equation model with feedback across the equations that we estimate 
with state-level data for 1978-96:   
1 1 5 4 3 2 1 ) 1 ( ε α α α α α + + + + + = X Off Exit Conc Size TFP  
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The five equations are for productivity (TFP), average farm size (Size), an indicator of the 
concentration in farm production (Conc), the odds that a farm exits the sector (Exit), and the odds 
that farm operators work off-farm at least 200 days per year (Off).  The Conc indicator of the farm 
size distribution is specified as the share of farms that produce 50 percent of the total product.  So, 
the larger the Conc indicator, the less the concentration in the sector.  The earlier work using state-
level data has measured farm size as the average for the state.  In this paper we prefer to use the 
traditional measure (i.e., the average farm size) and this additional measure of the size distribution 
(i.e., Conc) that captures information about the extent of the skewness of the distribution.  All states 
have a size distribution dominated by many small farms, but vary in the extent of concentration of 
production by the largest farms.  This indicator allows us to capture the variation in size masked by 
a state average, although we acknowledge that any single indicator of farm size has advantages and 
disadvantages.   
  There is an established literature on the key variables for all of our equations on which we 
base our model specifications.  For productivity, for example, public investments in research and 
development have been found to be positively related to productivity (e.g., Yee, et al., 2002).  There   13
is also an extensive literature on the factors explaining off-farm work of farm households, including 
Hallberg, Findeis, and Lass (1991).  Following the financial conditions of the 1980s, ERS supported 
several studies of farm exits.  These included Bentley, et al. (1989); Bentley and Saupe (1990); and 
Wu (1997).  Although the focus of this body of the literature was not on structural implications of 
policy, it does provide some guidance on the exit model specification. Barkley (1990) examined the 
role played by government payments in the decline in the use of labor, as a production input, over 
time. The farm size equation is informed by a vast historical, yet conflicting, literature as discussed 
previously.  For example, see Harrington and Reinsel (1995) for a review. 
Table 2 and the Appendix provide more detail on the definition of our variables and our data 
sources, respectively.  The set of exogenous variables (X1) included in the TFP equation are public 
agricultural research stocks (from originating state and spill-ins), public extension, infrastructure in 
highways, government agricultural programs (commodity payments, dairy production, and set 
asides), specialization, contracting, ratio of capital rental-to-hired farm wage, weather, and 
geographic region.  The set of exogenous variables (X2) included in the Size equation are public 
agricultural research stocks (from originating state and spill-ins), public extension, ratio of capital 
rental-to-hired farm wage, commodity payments, specialization, contracting, share of operators 
aged, and geographic region.  The set of exogenous variables (X3) included in the Conc equation are 
public agricultural research stocks (from originating state and spill-ins), public extension, ratio of 
capital rental-to-hired farm wage, commodity payments, specialization, contracting, land value per 
acre, and geographic region. The set of exogenous variables (X4) included in the Exit equation are 
ratio of manufacturing wage-to-hired farm wage, specialization, contracting, commodity payments, 
share of college educated operators, share of operators aged, population density in non-metro areas, 
land value per acre, and geographic region.   The set of exogenous variables (X5) included in the Off   14
equation are infrastructure in highways, specialization, contracting, commodity payments, 
conservation payments, ratio of manufacturing wage-to-hired farm wage, dairy production, share of 
college educated operators, share of young operators, share of a state’s population living in non-
metro areas, population density in non-metro areas, and geographic region.   
 
Hypotheses 
Because of the complex interactions among the variables thought to affect structure, we are 
especially interested in the relationships between our endogenous variables.  But, the most 
important set of relationships of interest are those that capture the role of government policies.  
Hence, to highlight these relationships, we formalize our expectations about these relationships in 
the following hypotheses:    
  Hypothesis I: An increase in government agricultural payments has no effect on farm 
productivity; with the alternative being a positive effect; 
  Hypothesis II: An increase in government agricultural payments has no effect on the average 
size of farms; with the alternative being an increase in average farm size. 
  Hypothesis III: An increase in government agricultural payments has no effect on the size 
distribution of farms; with the alternative being an increase in the concentration of production.  
  Hypothesis IV: An increase in government agricultural payments has no effect on the exiting 
of all farms; with the alternative being a positive effect; and  
  Hypothesis V: An increase in government agricultural payments (both commodity and 
conservation) has no effect on off-farm work of farm operators; with the alternative being a 
negative effect. 
       15
Results   
We estimate the model by three-stage-least squares, incorporating cross-equation correlation of 
disturbances.  We choose to limit our analysis to the 1978 to 1996 time period in large part because 
the uniqueness of this application is the addition of the dynamic structural variables, which are only 
available to us from 1978 forward.  The estimated coefficients for the structural model are reported 
in Table 3.  A large share of the estimated coefficients is significantly different from zero and the 
share of the variation explained is good.  
Table 3 presents the full set of econometrics results.   Our description here will focus on the 
results pertaining to the endogenous relationships and the hypotheses stated above.  For all 5 
equations, the majority of the relationships among the endogenous variables were significant, 
indicating the importance of estimating the relationships simultaneously.
4  The directions of the 
significant relationships were consistent with prior econometric results (where they existed in the 
literature) and with reasonable expectations.  The exception to this is the relationships between Off 
and Size.   We expected an increase in the off-farm work choice of operators to be negatively related 
to farm size and the farm size choice to be negatively related to the off-farm work choice. This 
expectation is based on our observation of the simple correlations between the variables, given the 
fixed time available in the household.  While we did find farm size to have a negative effect on the 
off-farm work choice, we also found that an increase in off-farm work of the operator had a positive 
effect on farm size.  Perhaps this indicates that when all other factors are controlled for, off-farm 
sources of income allow the operators to expand their farm size.   
                                                 
4 The relationships which were not significant are the following:  Exit was not significantly related to TFP, and 
TFP was not significant in the Exit equation.  TFP was not significant in the Off equation, either, although the reverse 
was not true.  Conc was not significant in the Size equation.  Off was not significant in the Exit equation.  
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Hypothesis I cannot be rejected.  We did not find that government commodity payments had 
a significant effect on productivity of the sector.  This was not consistent with the result found by 
previous work for the 1950-82 time period and the 1960-96 time period which found a small 
positive effect of payments on productivity.  Agricultural policies change, usually about every 5 
years, and of course are designed to change as economic conditions change for the sector on an 
annual basis.  Hence, we should not necessarily expect the results to be consistent for all time 
periods.  
Hypotheses II and III relating to the effects of payments on the farm size distribution can be 
rejected, since we found significant effects of payments on these two indicators of the farm size 
distribution.   For the average farm size measure, we found that payments had a positive effect, 
consistent with the past results for the 1950-1982 period (Huffman and Evenson) and the 1960-1996 
period (Ahearn, Yee, and Huffman).  However, we also found that the alternative hypothesis III is 
rejected, as well, because we found that payments had a positive effect on increasing the share of 
farms that account for 50% of production.   In other words, payments tend to lessen consolidation in 
the sector. 
Hypothesis IV relating to farm exits can also be rejected.  We found that payments tended to 
increase the share of farms that exit the sector.  This is seemingly not consistent with the result 
found by Key and Roberts when they considered the impact of payments on the exiting of the subset 
of farms that received payments.  But, the differing populations involved must be considered, and 
then the two sets of results are in fact complementary. In other words, payments increase the 
survivability of those minority of farms in the sector that receive payments, but decrease the 
survivability of all farms taken as a whole.     17
Hypothesis V relating to off-farm work can also be rejected.  We found that payments had a 
negative impact on the off-farm work participation of farm operators.  This result has been very 
robust in previous studies, both using aggregate and household-level data, whether payments are 
coupled or decoupled from production levels. 
 
Discussion 
We found that government payments increased the average farm size and increased farm exits in a 
state.  This can be explained by the farms who participated in programs expanding their farm size 
by buying out the farmland of non-participants.  Farmland is relatively fixed and the aggregate land 
used in agriculture has remained fairly stable over this period.  A major source of land for farm 
expansions, especially in specific regions, must generally come from farms exiting.  In fact, 
supporting statistics from the Census longitudinal file show that farms that exited were less likely to 
receive government payments.  For example, 25 percent of farms that exited between 1992 and 
1997 received payments compared to 40 percent that survived during this period.  Similarly, figure 
4 shows that cash grain and dairy farms, that are supported at a relatively high level compared to 
other U.S. farms, were the most likely to expand their farm size.  Figure 4 shows this relationship 
for the 1992-97 period, but it is consistent for the other census time periods between 1978 and 1992.  
At the same time that payments led to increased average farm size, they increased the share 
of farms that accounted for 50 percent of the production, i.e., they reduced the concentration of 
production.  This is likely because cash grain and cotton production is not as common among the 
very largest farms as it is among the mid-sized farms (see table 1), and payments help to keep the 
cash grain and cotton producers in business.  These results, on average farm size and production 
concentration, point to the importance of considering the size distribution of farms, and not just   18
average farm sizes, when examining the structural implications of policies.   While our results were 
not intended to address the issue of anti-competitive market power as a result of trends in 
industrialization, they do suggest that consolidation has led to increased productivity in the sector.  
As the share of the largest farms that account for 50% of agricultural production decreases, i.e., 
concentration increases, productivity also increases. 
Payments were also found to have a negative impact on the probability that an operator 
would work off the farm full-time.  This result is logically consistent with the results on farm size.  
If payments help to keep mid-sized family farms in agriculture and slow down the trend for 
production to be concentrated on an increasingly small share of farms, then farm operators must 
work full-time on their farms.  In contrast, the majority of farm operators operate small farms, 
accounting for a small share of agricultural product, and working full-time off their farm.  We found 
this same result, regardless if the payments were commodity payments or conservation payments.  
This period 1978-96 is an interesting one for considering conservation payments because of the 
introduction of the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) with the 1985 farm bill.  Large amounts 
of acreage were enrolled in the CRP by 1987, and continued to be enrolled in 10- or 15-year 
contracts through the period.   
 
Concluding Remarks 
In order to understand the sources of structural change the relationships must be considered over 
time because of the lengthy lags of their impacts, policy and otherwise.  In addition, structural 
change must be considered in the context of the whole farm sector because of the extensive linkages 
in the marketplace for land, inputs, and outputs, agricultural and otherwise. Our results support the 
view that the structural change process is a complex one, involving the interplay among   19
technological change, market forces, and public policies.  Consequently, policies designed to impact 
a single target, such as productivity or family farm survivability, will likely have reverberating 
structural implications, perhaps even counterintuitive or unwanted affects.   
  We find that while government payments may have led to increasing average farm size and 
exits from agriculture, it has also reduced the concentration of production.  This pair of results have 
not been jointly considered in previous studies.  By doing so, we have helped explain the opposing 
views provided by experts who conjecture on the impacts of farm policies on farm structure without 
the benefit of the empirical analysis.  Payments have also had a significant impact on the decisions 
of farm operators to allocate their labor to the farm, rather than pursue off-farm work opportunities.   
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 Appendix: Data and Variables 
 
Total Factor Productivity (TFP).  Total factor productivity (TFP) is the ratio of total outputs to 
total inputs.  Data on TFP by state are available from the ERS homepage at: 
http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/data-sets/inputs/98003.  The TFP numbers for each state are 
spatially adjusted so that they are comparable across states.   
Farm output consists of all crop and livestock products.   Farm inputs include capital 
(durable equipment and real estate), labor, and intermediate inputs.   Intermediate inputs consist of 
fertilizer, pesticides, energy, feed, seed, and intermediate livestock inputs. 
Some inputs, such as agricultural pesticides, have changed significantly over time.  The 
current approach to dealing with variable input quality is to account for the quality changes in key 
inputs, where data availability permit, through a process of measuring the component characteristics 
of the input that are relevant to the observed quality changes.  To properly account for changes in 
characteristics or quality of chemicals, price indexes of fertilizers and pesticides were constructed 
using the hedonic regression technique.    
While the number of workers employed in agriculture and total hours worked have declined, 
the quality per hour worked has increased.   For example, in 1964, only about one-third of all 
farmers had completed high school, compared with more than three-quarters of farmers by 1990.  
The labor measure accounts for both change in hours worked and change in the quality of those 
labor hours. 
 
Off-farm work (off).   Off-farm work is measured as the odds of the farm operator working off the 
farm for 200 or more days per year. 
 
Farm Size (size).   Farm size is measured as the real average agricultural use value of farms in a 
state.  The average use value per farm is calculated as the product of the average acres of land in a 
farm and the market rental rate per acre for land rented.  Note that this assumes that the rental rate is 
a good rental measure for all land, whether rented or owned.  The use value is deflated by the prices 
received index. 
 
Farm concentration (conc).   The distribution of farm product is measured as the share of the 
farms in a state that account for 50% of production.  This size indicator better communicates 
information about the concentration of the product of farms in a state than does an average farm 
size.  See the description below for more detail on the data source, the longitudinal file of the 
Census of Agriculture. 
 
Farm Exits (exit).  The annual share of farms that exit is measured by interpolating the multiple-
year exit rate from the 5 agricultural censuses that were conducted from 1978-1997.  See the 
description below for more detail on the data source, the longitudinal file of the Census of 
Agriculture. 
 
R&D Stock (ownrd, spillin).  Data on public agricultural research expenditures to enhance and 
maintain agricultural productivity up to 1995 are an enhanced version of the series provided in 
Huffman and Evenson (1993).  The annual nominal agricultural research expenditures by state are 
converted to real (1984 = 1.00) expenditures using Huffman and Evenson’s agricultural research 
price index.   23
Research expenditures in a given year are expected to have an impact on productivity for 
many years.  However, including a large number of lagged research expenditures in the productivity 
equation uses up a large number of degrees of freedom.  Also, the lagged values of the research 
expenditures tend to be highly correlated.  Consequently, we constructed a research stock variable 
as a weighted sum of current and past research expenditures.  
Most studies of the impact of research, especially private research in manufacturing, 
construct the stock of research capital from research expenditures using the perpetual inventory 
method and assuming geometric decay.  While geometric decay may be a reasonable assumption for 
physical capital, it is not plausible for research capital.  We constructed a research stock variable as 
a weighted sum of current and past research expenditures using the Huffman and Evenson (1993) 
trapezoidal-timing-weights over 33 years.  The plot of the cumulative summation of these weights 
over time gives a sigmoid S-shaped pattern. 
Two public research stock variables are used in this paper, an own-state and a 
spillin/spillover.  For example, some of the public agricultural research discoveries in Iowa may 
spillover to one or more of the surrounding states or Iowa may benefit from public agricultural 
research conducted in surrounding states.  We impose the simplifying assumption that benefits are 
regionally confined.  For a given state in a region, the spillover (or spillin) stock is defined as the 
total public agricultural research stock of all states in the region less the state’s own public 
agricultural research stock. 
 
Extension Stock (ext).  Data on professional extension full-time equivalents (FTE’s) by state and 
major program areas.  Over most of the period, extension was organized into four program areas: 
agriculture and natural resources (ANR), community resource development (CRD), 4-H youth (4-
H), and home economics (HE).  This paper only considers the ANR program area, which includes 
crop production and management, livestock production and management, farm business 
management, agricultural marketing and supply, and natural resources.  An extension capital stock 
for each state is obtained as a weighted sum of current and past FTE’s with declining weights and 
dividing by the number of farms. 
 
Highway Stock (hiway).  Data are available for 1931-1992 on capital stock from capital outlay and 
capital stock from maintenance (both in 1987 dollars) from the U.S. Department of Transportation, 
State Transportation Economic Division.  In this data set, the standard perpetual inventory 
technique was used to generate the highway capital stock from expenditure data.  We regressed 
highway stock on a constant, time, time squared, and time cubed and used the fitted equation to 
predict highway stock after 1992.  
Weather (flood, drought).  Extreme weather conditions (droughts and floods) affect agricultural 
productivity.  We employed the USDA’s precipitation data weighted by harvested crop acreage 
(available from the ERS homepage as an ERS data product) to create a variable (pre-plant) equal to 
cumulative February to July rainfall.  We then created a drought dummy variable (drought) equal to 
1 if pre-plant is less than 1 standard deviation below normal (and 0 otherwise) and a flood dummy 
variable (flood) equal to 1 if pre-plant is more than 1 standard deviation above normal (and 0 
otherwise). 
 
Specialization (spec).  Specialization is computed as a Herfindahl index based on cash receipts of 
10 commodity categories.  Cash receipts are the value of agricultural production sold in a particular   24
calendar year.  As such, it would include the value of product produced in previous years, stored 
and sold in the current year.  It would exclude the value of product produced in the current year and 
stored for later sale.  It would also exclude the value of product from current year, which is used on 
the farm from which it was produced, usually as livestock feed.  Cash receipts are largely computed 
from annual USDA probability-based surveys of prices and quantities.  In some cases, when a 
commodity is heavily concentrated in a few states or represents a small share of production, state-
level agricultural statisticians provide the estimates of cash receipts of the commodity. 
 
Dairy Share of Total Cash Receipts (dairy).  Cash receipts are the value of agricultural 
production sold in a particular calendar year.  As such, it would include the value of product 
produced in previous years, stored and sold in the current year.  It would exclude the value of 
product produced in the current year and stored for later sale.  It would also exclude the value of 
product from current year, which is used on the farm from which it was produced, usually as 
livestock feed.  Cash receipts are largely computed from annual USDA probability-based surveys of 
prices and quantities.  In some cases, when a commodity is heavily concentrated in a few states or 
represents a small share of production, state-level agricultural statisticians provide the estimates of 
cash receipts of the commodity. 
 
Commodity Payments (compay).  Commodity payments are direct payments made to farm 
operators and others who own farmland and are eligible to receive subsidies under the continuing 
legislation of the so-called farm bill.  The exact nature of the programs and eligibility of the 
programs has changed many times since the first Depression-era program.  The payments are made 
largely by the Federal government, although some state program subsidies are included.  The data 
are annual administrative records information on payments made for the agricultural programs that 
are associated with agricultural production.  
 
Diverted acres (setaside).  Diverted acres are those acres that were required to be set-aside as part 
of voluntary Federal farm programs in exchange for direct payments for the production of seven 
program crops.  Acres that were diverted varied on an annual basis, as announced by the Secretary 
of Agriculture.  In some years, additional acreage could be diverted under the Paid Land Diversion 
program.  The source of the data are administrative records. 
 
Conservation Payments (conpay).  A variety of conservation programs have been established 
during our study period.  The largest program during the period is the Conservation Reserve 
Program, established in 1985.  Conservation payments are for conservation programs: CRP, WRP, 
WHIP, EQIP, currently and different ones historically. 
 
Contracting (contract).  Production contracts are the number of farms in a state that had any 
production contracts to produce any agricultural commodity.  Under a production contract, an 
operator-grower contracts with a processor-integrator to produce and make available for delivery a 
specified product, sometimes with specified quality attributes for a specified time.  The contractor 
takes possession of the commodity and pays the grower a fee.  Terms of contracts vary widely.  The 
Census of Agriculture, taken of farms every 4 or 5 years, provided us with the actual number of 
production contracts for the census years.  We interpolated for intercensal years using a straight-line 
approach. 
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Input Prices (kw, mw).  Where published government statistics existed we utilized those.  
However, for some years, state-level data were not available and so we estimated state-level data 
from regional data and/or interpolated between known benchmark data.  Manufacturing wage rates 
came from the Current Population Survey, BLS, Dept. of Labor, various years.  Farm wage rates 
came from NASS, USDA.  Farm machinery price is a national price from the ERS homepage. 
 
Educational Attainment (college).  Operator educational attainment as a categorical variable is 
collected occasionally on the Census of Agriculture, for example, 1964.  For the most recent year of 
our data series, 1996, we used an average of three years (1995-97) from USDA's Agricultural 
Resource Management Survey.  We interpolated in between benchmarks.    
 
Age of Operator (young, old).   We construct two age variables, old and young.  Young is the 
share of operators that are less than 35 years old.  Another age variable, old, is the share of 
operators that are 65 years or older.  Operator age is available from the Census of Agriculture.  We 
interpolated in between Census benchmarks. 
 
Non-metro population (popnm).  The share of a state’s population living in non-metro areas.  The 
land area non-metro designation is changed based on each decennial census of population.  
Population estimates are made annually by the Bureau of the Census.  
 
Non-metro population density (popden).  The population density in non-metro areas, measured as 
population per square mile. 
 
The Census of Agriculture Longitudinal File  
The Census of Agriculture has been conducted for over 150 years. In 1997, responsibility was 
transferred from the Bureau of the Census to National Agricultural Statistics Service.  The Census 
of Agriculture Longitudinal file is a subset of the Census files; developed by combining individual 
farm operator records for five censuses (1978, 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997) into one continuous 
record.  Each record represents one individual farm operator’s responses about a farm operation to 
all and/or any censuses. Thus, farms can be followed for a 20 year period.  The file contains 4.5 
million observations (records) and 85 analysis variables.  
The longitudinal file attempts to follow farm operations which are tied to the farm land 
rather than follow individual farm operators.  This is done using the Census File Number (CFN).  
The CFN identifies a farm operation for a particular census, and may follow a farm operation 
through subsequent censuses (up to five on the longitudinal file).  If the farm continues from one 
census to the next, and the farm operator responds to the census using the same CFN, the 
information reported by that farm for that census period is appended to the longitudinal file using 
the same CFN.  If the operation changes hands, either through sale or inheritance, the CFN may 
continue, it may change, or it may be terminated.  A farm is defined as going out of business when 
either the questionnaire is returned with the indication that it is no longer operating as a farm, or 
there is no response to repeated requests for information.  The absence of a farm in a particular 
census year is represented in the longitudinal file by zeros for all the variables for that observation 
for that year. We consider a farm to be out of business (an exit) when zeroes in the CFN field 
indicate that the farm has been discontinued. Likewise a farm operation with a CFN that is not 
matched or linked to a previous longitudinal record would be considered a new business and added   26
to the longitudinal file as a new record.  This is an entry.   A farm which has a CFN for both a 
beginning and an ending census time period in its record is considered to be a survivor.  
 
  While the CFN is unique to a single farm operation the opposite is not necessarily true.  A 
single farm does not necessarily have one unique CFN.  A CFN must only be unique to a farm 
operation for a given Census time period.  Therefore a single farm operation could have as many as 
5 CFNs on the longitudinal file, one for each census.  While a farm operation’s CFN may extend to 
subsequent censuses, this may not be the case if a farm changes hands.  If a farm operation changes 
hands, the CFN may or may not change.  If the operation is taken over by a family member it would 
likely continue with the old number, however if it is sold it would probably receive a new number.  
In this case the new number and the old number would be linked together.  This linking would 
require matching farm operations either manually or by computer.   Matching new CFNs to old 
CFNs would be performed by the data collection agency, either the Census Bureau or NASS.  
Linking allows data for the new CFN, to be added to longitudinal data from the previous census 
under the old CFN, thereby extending the longitudinal record.  If the farm is sold and no link 
established, (there is no evidence that this farm is continuing), then zeroes are recorded in the 
longitudinal CFN field and other data fields for that record for that census period.  Farms that are 
split up may have a portion of their operation continue under the old number and the rest under a 
new number/s, or all parcels of the operation may receive new numbers.   
 
  Most observations on the longitudinal file represent only themselves and are assigned a non 
response weight of one.  Some farms have a weight of 2 meaning they represent themselves and 
another farm that did not respond to the Census.  This means that the one which did respond was 
assumed to be similar to one which did not and is therefore counted twice in the statistics.  If the 
non-responding operation was a large farm, as defined by value of production or acreage, or a 
unique farm operation, intensive telephone or personal follow-up was conducted during census 
processing to obtain a response.  If these attempts failed, either the NASS survey database, the 
census historic database, or other more current sources were used to impute data for the operation.  
As a result, all large farms are assigned a nonresponse weight of 1.    27
 
Table 1 – Farm operator household characteristics, by sales classes, 2002   
   Sales classes      





$499,999  >=$500,000   48-State total
     Number  
  
Total operator households  1,624,109  165,488  181,643 83,930 59,654  2,114,824 
  
     Percent  
  
Distribution of farms by specialization 
   Cash grains  8.4  35.9  39.5  35.3  14.9  14.5 
   High value crops  4.6  9.4  8.4  11.8  19.1  6.0 
   Other crops  25.7  14.4 10.3 11.6 10.5 22.5 
   Beef, hogs and poultry  39.8  26.0  22.1  26.2  41.4  36.7 
   Dairy  0.6  10.8  17.5  12.7  11.6  3.6 
   Other livestock  20.8  na  2.2  *2.5  *2.4  16.6 
  
Distribution of commodities produced 
   One commodity  76.6 22.9 18.9 24.1 27.3 64.0 
   Two commodities  17.4  37.6  34.5  27.0  28.9  21.1 
   Three commodities  4.2  20.9  23.6  23.2  20.9  8.4 
   Four or more commodities  1.8  18.6  23.0  25.7  22.9  6.5 
  
Share of farms with contracts  3.5 23.3 33.6 46.0 64.8 11.0 
  
     Dollars per household  
  
Household income  62,654  53,338 69,173 72,632  164,643 65,757 
   Farm earnings  -4,776  *7,269  20,449  33,517  123,561  *3,473 
   Off-farm income  67,430  46,069  48,724  39,115  41,082  62,285 
     Earned  50,233  34,975  38,169  28,782  27,893  46,521 
     Unearned  17,197  11,094  10,555  10,332  13,189  15,764 
  
Government payments 
   All households  1,244  6,516  12,932  19,495  21,663  3,961 
   Reporting households  3,641  8,717 16,456 25,460 34,008  9,069 
  
     Percent  
  
Share of farms with government payments  34.2 74.7 78.6 76.6 63.7 43.7 
Share of farms with off-farm earned  income 74.4 69.6 63.6 61.1 52.8 72.0 
Share of land rented in  30.9 49.1 53.9 58.4 55.5 46.5 
Share of farms with more than one operator 30.0  30.9  39.9 45.3 55.1 32.2 
Share of farms providing income to multiple  
  households  6.9 11.8 15.9 23.3 35.3  9.5 
  
     Percent of households  
  
Households with 
   Positive household income and- 
   Loss from farming  67.9 31.0 18.4 10.0  9.7 56.9 
   Gain from farming  28.0 58.1 68.6 70.2 71.1 36.7 
   Negative household income  4.1 10.9 13.0 19.8 19.2  6.4 
  
     Dollars per household  
  
Farm household assets  503,033  804,652  948,586 1,197,073 1,854,893  630,581 
   Farm assets  348,648  697,449  828,054 1,056,588 1,674,426  482,611 
   Non-farm assets  154,385  107,203  120,532  140,485  180,466  147,970 
  
Farm household debt  59,500  106,882 142,023 227,503 462,597  88,333 
   Farm debt  23,596  83,130  116,468  199,759  409,500  54,109   28
   Non-farm debt  35,903  23,751  25,555  27,744  53,097  34,225 
  
Farm household net worth  443,534  697,770 806,563 969,569  1,392,296 542,248 
   Farm net worth  325,052  614,318 711,586 856,829  1,264,927 428,503 
   Non-farm net worth  118,482  83,452  94,977 112,740 127,369 113,745 
  
   Source:  2002 USDA Agricultural Resource Management Survey.  
   Based on 11,926 observations.(11,926 Households).  Expansion factor=vallwt0.  Versions=1 and 2.  
   All 48 contiguous States were included in the sample. 
   Coefficient of Variation = (Standard Error/Estimate)*100.  * indicates that CV is greater than 25 and less than or equal to 50.     
   na indicates value is not available due to no observations, an undefined statistic, or reliability concerns. 
   Rounded percents may not add precisely to 100.  
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Table 2.  Variable Definitions 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Variable   Definition 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
TFP                 Level of total factor productivity (relative to Alabama in 1987) 
size   Real  land  rental per farm 
conc                 Share of farms in state accounting for 50% of total production 
exit    Exit rate per year 
off    Proportion of farm operators who worked 200 or more days off farm 
ownrd              Own research stock 
spillin              Spillin research stock 
ext                   Extension stock per farm 
hiway              Highway stock 
spec        Specialization computed as a herfindahl index, based on 10 commodity categories 
contract  Proportion of farms with production contracts 
compay   Real commodity payments per farm 
conpay   Real conservation payments per farm 
setaside  Diverted acres per farm 
valueacre         Real land and building value per acre 
college   Proportion of farm operators with a 4-year college education or more 
young    Proportion of farm operators under 35 years old 
old    Proportion of farm operators 65 years old and over 
kw    Farm machinery price - hired farm labor wage ratio (lagged one year) 
mw    Manufacturing wage - hired farm labor wage ratio (lagged one year) 
popnm   Proportion of a state’s population living in non-metro areas  
popden   Population density in non-metro areas 
drought            Drought dummy 
flood                Flood dummy 
dairy  Dummy variable equal to 1 if dairy is greater than 20% of total cash receipts 
______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Notes: “ℓ” in front of a variable denotes taking the log (e.g., ℓTFP).   
 
Regional dummy variables are included in each equation.  The regions considered in this paper are: 
1.  Northeast (NE): CT, DE, ME, MD, MA, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT 
2.  Southeast (SE): AL, FL, GA, KY, NC, SC, TN, VA, WV 
3.  Central (CENT): IN, IL, IA, MI, MO, MN, OH, WI 
4.  Northern Plains (NP): KS, NE, ND, SD 
5.  Southern Plains (SP): AR, LA, MS, OK, TX 
6.  Mountain (MOUNT): AZ, CO, ID, MT, NV, NM, UT, WY 
7.  Pacific (PAC): CA, OR, WA 
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Table 3. Three stage least squares estimates of productivity and 
structural equations, 1978-96 (n = 912) 
 
 




ℓtfp                        2.075*   -1.141*     0.017       0.058 
ℓsize             0.273*              0.860*     0.144*     -0.243* 
ℓconc            -0.293*    0.039               -0.120*     -0.164* 
ℓ[exit/(1-exit)]  0.142    -1.900*   -3.009*                 0.623* 
ℓ[off/(1-off)]   -0.568*    0.874*   -1.433*    -0.040 
  
Exogenous variables 
ℓownrd            0.112*   -0.040    -0.022 
ℓspillin          0.100*    0.060     0.178* 
ℓext             -0.042     0.258*   -0.059 
ℓhiway           -0.114*                                     0.035* 
ℓspec            -0.098*    0.164*   -0.469*    -0.074*     -0.198* 
ℓcontract        -0.018*    0.035*   -0.060*    -0.016*      0.012 
ℓcompay           0.003     0.156*    0.082*     0.042*     -0.070* 
ℓconpay                                                     -0.032* 
setaside         -0.001* 
ℓvalueacre                           -0.195*    -0.076* 
ℓpopnm                                                       0.008 
ℓpopden                                          0.033*      0.003 
ℓkw              -0.067     0.418*    0.329 
ℓmw                                              0.011       0.402* 
ℓcollege                                        -0.035       0.366* 
ℓyoung                                                       0.288* 
ℓold                       -0.817*               0.047 
drought          -0.012 
flood             0.008 
dairy            -0.028                                     -0.166* 
  
Regions 
SE               -0.334*    0.389*   -0.811*    -0.162*      0.430* 
CENT             -0.442*    0.927*   -1.459*    -0.320*      0.434* 
NP               -1.004*    1.743*   -3.401*    -0.584*      0.096 
SP               -0.776*    1.263*   -2.020*    -0.329*      0.343* 
MOUNT            -0.984*    1.868*   -2.816*    -0.409*      0.342* 
PAC              -0.616*    1.126*   -1.884*    -0.315*      0.202* 
  
Intercept        -2.429    -3.982   -17.478*    -3.138*     -0.240 
  
R
2                 0.275     0.654     0.393      0.448       0.729 
 
 
* Denotes significant at the 5% level. 
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Figure 1. 
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Source:  Censuses of Agriculture, various years. 
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Figure 4. 
 


























Source:  Census of Agriculture. 
 